Before Narrative:Episodic Reading and Representations of Chronic Pain by Wasson, Sara
 1 
 
Before narrative: episodic reading and representations of chronic pain  
Dr Sara Wasson 
(Lancaster University) 




This article suggests that some illness experience may require a reading practice less 
concerned with narrative coherence or self-authorship, and more interested in the value of 
textual fragments, episodes and moments considered outside a narrative framework. Chronic 
pain can pose multiple challenges to the narrative orientations celebrated in both 
‘survivorship’ discourse and classic medical humanities scholarship. In its recalcitrance to 
cure, its often-mysterious etiology, and its complex blend of somatic, interpersonal and 
affective elements, representations of chronic pain can require a richer vocabulary of 
temporality. I draw on contemporary affect theory to augment the available critical 
vocabulary for the textual representation of protagonists’ temporal orientation within illness 
experience, identifying a language for the emergent present that resists a narrative form. 
Beyond identifying narrative ‘incoherence’, affect discourse gives a way to recognise the 
strained, equivocal labour of incoherence, of inhabiting a cryptic present moment. Affect 
theory’s attention to the emergent present may give a way to read incoherent ‘chaos’ outside 
from a narrative framework, not only as a dark, formless stage in a personal story. To expand 
our vocabulary for this position, I offer a term for a particular affective experience of the 
present amid repeated marginalisation: the temporality of thwarted connection. I illustrate 
how these concepts can enable an alternative reading stance by offering a brief analysis of 
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Lous Heshusius’s hybrid autobiography and academic study, Chronic Pain from the Inside 
Out. 
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Recent work in health humanities and critical medical humanities has sought to augment 
traditional approaches to narrativity.[1-10] Building on such scholarship, this article seeks to 
broaden the way illness narratives of chronic pain are approached. First, I suggest that certain 
conventions of illness narrative can come to seem typical of experience in ways that may be 
detrimental to some living with chronic pain. I argue that some illness experience may 
require a parallel reading practice, reading less in search of narrative coherence or self-
authorship, and more interested in the value of textual fragments, episodes and moments 
considered outside a narrative framework. Second, I draw on contemporary affect theory to 
augment the available critical vocabulary for the textual representation of protagonists’ 
temporal orientation within illness experience, identifying a language for the emergent 
present that resists a narrative form. Third, I will illustrate how this approach can enable an 
alternative reading stance by offering a brief analysis of Lous Heshusius’s hybrid 
autobiography and academic study, Chronic Pain from the Inside Out.[11] Reading this work 
‘episodically’, i.e. without a narrative arc as a critical focus, enables a critical approach less 
alert to the individual journey of a self-authoring patient and more attuned to the social 
context for chronic pain suffering and the complex temporality of the experience of structural 
marginalisation. This article is about reading differently, and in the process making space for 
experience which tends to be unhearable even within the capacious realms of medical and 
health humanities.  
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People living with chronic pain are particular vulnerable to such erasure. A ‘silent 
epidemic’ and a ‘global public health priority’, chronic pain affects nearly 28 million people 
in the UK and 20% of the global adult population.[12-14] Defined as pain that endures for 
more than six months, chronic pain can be as severe as acute pain, damages interpersonal 
relationships, and increases suicide risk.[15-18] Yet people enduring chronic pain are often 
oddly invisible, with healthcare practitioners, kin, and employers failing to recognise the 
severity of their experience. Sufferers often endure a representational crisis, struggling to 
communicate their experience amid stigma and invisibility. In response, this article is part of 
a wider project seeking to expand the critical vocabulary around the analysis of chronic pain 
representation. Although I am exploring cases where pain involves suffering, that is not to 
say that ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ are synonymous (and ‘disability’ of course does not 
necessarily involve either).[19]  
 
NARRATIVE HIERARCHIES AND CHRONIC PAIN  
 
It is a widespread contention in narratology that a narrative is informed by a sense of the 
ending to which it moves.[20] Peter Brooks notes that the telos ‘shapes a story and gives it a 
certain direction or intent of meaning,’[21] and Lennard Davis coined the term ‘teleogenic’ to 
denote the way certain kinds of narration are informed by a sense of their close.[22] As Sara 
Ahmed says, ‘Reading for narrative is reading for the direction of its point’.[23] In this 
article, I argue that conventions of narrative telos are a key way that illness narrations achieve 
normative work, demonstrating modes of being ill that have moral authority within particular 
cultural milieux. To avoid marginalising vulnerable voices, it may be that we need a 
complementary critical stance less attentive to the narrative arc of a text -- and as such less 
attentive to an individual’s ‘personal illness journey’.[24-27] To put it another way, as Judy 
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Segal says, this is not just about multiplying alternative illness stories, but also making a 
space for story that does not fit the expected form of ‘story’ at all.[28] I will briefly examine 
how certain dominant expectations of illness narrative create and legitimise particular 
protagonist temporal orientations, and then I will describe how chronic pain can challenge 
these representations as well as the critical postures they have tended to engender. 
In the ‘survivor’ genre of illness memoir, people facing illness are urged to self-
position as ‘fighters’, which denotes having a ‘positive’ attitude and complying with 
practitioner instruction.[29-31] ‘Fighter’ rhetoric also recruits medical patients to biopolitical 
self-surveillance and lifestyle management.[32-34] Internalising survivorship discourse 
requires proleptically positioning oneself within a particular narrative expectation, invested in 
an eventual imagined triumph. This moral stance is reinforced by a narrative arc of 
‘restitution’ (to use Arthur Frank’s term), characterised by patient faith in medicine’s ability 
to restore health.[25] This narrative expectation limits what stories can be recognised within 
popular contexts, and refusing this narrative prolepsis is framed as moral failure.[35-37]  
By contrast, medical humanities scholarship has long challenged such triumphalist 
narration, as well as emphasising the need for patients’ stories to counter the detachment of 
biomedical discourse.[24-27] Yet many of these classic texts, too, celebrate particular 
narrative typologies and certain ideal temporal orientations for the protagonist. A recurring 
theme is the necessity of being able to represent the experience of a narratively coherent self. 
Frank, for example, describes how during illness, one may lose: 
the central resource that any storyteller depends on: a sense of temporality… 
The illness story is wrecked because its present is not what the past was 
supposed to lead up to, and the future is scarcely thinkable ….The way out of 
narrative wreckage is telling stories… the self is being formed [anew] on what 
is told.[25]  
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In such a view, a particular coherence in one’s story and a particular temporal orientation are 
seen as indispensable for life to be bearable. Illness is often described in terms of a narrative 
crisis, being locked in a present without a sense of a coherent narrative of past and imagined 
future. Ruth Nadelhaft, for example, describes illness ‘tak[ing] place in what seems an eternal 
present. Past health and future recovery vanish in the face of the endless formlessness and 
present tense of the experience of pain …Literature offers form, structure, and the illusion of 
dimension to what was out of control and without limit’.[38] Anne Hunsaker Hawkins 
suggests that illness narratives try to ‘restore to reality its lost coherence and … discover, or 
create, a meaning that can bind it together again’.[39] Similarly, Rita Charon suggests that 
while medical practitioners inhabit ‘vectored time’, a time within which they can act and 
understand their actions as causally related, while patients inhabit ‘a timeless enduring’, 
where past/present/future are blurred, causality is mysterious, and agency is 
compromised.[26] Charon argues that ‘the narrating of the patient’s story is a therapeutically 
central act, because to find the words to contain the disorder and its attendant worries gives 
shape to and control over the chaos of the illness’.[40] In these models, writing helps one 
endure suffering by restoring a narrative form for one’s experience – and as a corollary, 
restoring a proleptic orientation for oneself as an agent who can take steps towards an 
imagined future. This is not to say that anyone naïvely assumes they are guaranteed a 
particular outcome, and indeed many illness narrations end ambiguously.[41] Rather, I am 
describing how the cultural dominance of particular narrative forms come to imply virtue 
within certain kinds of protagonist temporal orientation, specifically an expectation of 
beneficial transformation in time.  
Within Frank’s formulations, for example, a ‘quest’ narrative protagonist ‘honour[s]’ 
illness ‘for the sense of purpose that can be discovered in it …opening oneself to be changed 
by its experience’, and within ‘broken narrative’, one achieves a modicum of coherence 
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collaboratively, with others helping to formulate one’s story.[42] Even when illness cannot be 
cured, the protagonist can have ‘intransitive hope’, remaining open to an unspecified but 
beneficial transformation to come.[25] These responses are beautiful and powerful, and I in 
no way write to demean them. But I do want to consider how when certain kinds of temporal 
orientation within a self-story are deemed indispensable to a bearable human life, we risk 
marginalising those who cannot or will not take that stance.  
Chronic pain can pose multiple challenges to the narrative orientations celebrated in 
both ‘survivorship’ discourse and classic medical humanities scholarship. In its recalcitrance 
to cure, its often-mysterious etiology, and its complex blend of somatic, interpersonal and 
affective elements, representations of chronic pain can require a richer vocabulary of 
temporality. Chronic pain disrupts the assumptions of our ‘analgesic culture’ that expects 
pain to be diagnosable and remediable.[43] As a result, people living with chronic pain 
occupy a liminal position, with the social peril that implies.[25,26,44-46] David Morris 
describes the isolation often attendant on chronic pain, which ‘seems to build up walls of 
separation’, ‘surrounding [people] with silence’.[47] Lara Birk writes in her autoethnography 
that severe pain ‘not only ruptured the coherence of my narrative, it precluded coherence as a 
narrative possibility. … the embodied narrative of the person in pain is unpredictable, 
unreliable, and seemingly unsuitable for communication’.[48] People living with chronic pain 
describe how their experience is disbelieved when it does not accord with expected 
narrations.[48-51] Norma Ware calls this process ‘delegitimation’, and the epistemic violence 
of such a process cannot be overstated.[51-53] In many cases the physical suffering is 
described as less unbearable than the emotional suffering of being disbelieved: ‘no 
[experience] was as devastating … as the humiliation that resulted from having their 
subjective perceptions and sensations of illness either trivialized or dismissed as 
psychosomatic'.[51] Many people living with chronic pain report that they are excluded, 
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marginalised, and disregarded, and a key part of this vulnerability stems from narrative 
transgression, the way they may not be able to adopt the proleptic subjectivity attendant on a 
particular teleogenic narrative. They may flout the narrative conventions to which illness 
experience should conform.  
Scholars of class, feminism and postcoloniality have identified many ways in which a 
narratively coherent self is a cultural construction imbricated with privilege. Matti Hyvärinen 
et al warn: 
The normative mission to find and value coherence marginalizes many 
narrative phenomena, omits non-fitting narrators, encourages scholars to read 
narratives obsessively from the perspective of coherence, and poses ethically 
questionable pressures upon narrators who have experienced severe political 
or other trauma. … [T]he imperative of coherence works to legitimise certain 
narratives while excluding or marginalising others from the narrative 
canon.[54]  
Similarly, Laura Salisbury, drawing on Angela Woods, warns that ‘linear narratives that 
stress deep psychological continuities across time and expressive, confessional “I” … might 
privilege and render problematically universal modes of subjectivity and self-expression that 
are, in fact, culturally and historically contingent’.[6] [9] [10] Building on such critique, I 
want to suggest that it may be beneficial to widen our temporal vocabulary around 
representations of chronic pain, both intratextually in describing protagonists’ temporal 
orientations, and extra-textually in describing the processes of critical activity. 
Reading without seeking coherence is not new – it has always existed as a counter-
strand in medical humanities. Leading proponents of a narrative sense of self readily 
acknowledge that formulating a coherent narrative may at times be impossible or 
ideologically problematic. Cheryl Mattingly, for example, suggests that sometimes ‘silences 
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or half-told tales disclose more’ than a ‘well-told tale’.[55] Frank describes representations of 
grief in which ‘the nature of the experience does not, cannot, and never will coalesce into a 
cohesive whole, as narrative traditions expect wholeness’,[56] and warns that dominant 
narrative forms can contribute to moral insularity, since ‘people have often learned their 
stories too well, so that other stories sound wrong at best and less than human at worst’.[57]  
Faced with these perils, one remedy is diversifying stories. But arguments have also 
been made for complementing analysis of narrative typologies with a renewed focus on 
fragments, mixed-genre modes, and non-narrative elements of textual representation such as 
metaphor, diction, syntax, and intertextuality.[1-2, 5-8, 58-60] Anne Whitehead suggests that 
‘fragmentary or mixed-media narrative modes’ may be valuable in conveying ‘chaotic and 
contingent’ illness experience.[60] Keir Waddington and Martin Willis remind us that, 
‘narratives need not be linear … nor need they offer logic, coherence, or temporal 
movement'.[8] An important alternative for reading for coherence comes from social science 
studies of oral narration. Mattingly suggests that the term ‘narrative drama’ can capture the 
way we ‘follow a narrative suspensefully, always reminded of the fragility of events, for 
things might have turned out differently’.[61] Mattingly describes ‘emergent narratives’ 
moments where a social interaction acquires a spontaneous narrative quality, the embodied 
experience (not just language) performing a sudden shared frame of reference. In these 
moments life is suddenly raised to a narrative form.[61] Mattingly’s model is invaluable in 
recognising how narrative form can be a delicate, spontaneous thing co-created in interaction; 
this is very different from teleogenic written memoir. Yet Mattingly is still describing 
narratives, stories moving in particular directions. Judy Segal suggests that when we 
approach illness primarily in terms of narrative, ‘we may find certain conventional structures 
too readily available, and then the whole process of figuring out if there is something to be 
learned from illness experience is shortcircuited by the salience of those structures’.[24] If 
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reading for narrative is ‘reading for the direction of its point’[23] and for the degree of 
narrative coherence or narrative drama, then I suggest that reading episodically is to read 
looking for a place to pause – to cease looking for the arc of the individual longitudinal 
journey, and instead to consider how a particular scene constructs an emergent present. To 
clarify this approach I will now draw on affect theory. 
 
 
AFFECT AND TEMPORALITY 
 
Affect theory is concerned with the inseparable entanglement of the somatic, the social, and 
(in some of its incarnations) the emotional.[62-67] This scholarship seeks language to 
describe emergent, visceral, often inchoate forces: as Joel Burges and Amy Elias say, this 
scholarship ‘is the effort to understand the present as it plays out in somatic contexts’.[68] 
Raymond Williams’s notion of ‘structures of feeling’ is helpful in considering the 
connections between visceral somatic experience, emotion, cognition and the social. In terms 
salient for the present discussion of chronic pain, Williams notes that structures of feeling are 
partially affective, in that they involve ‘a social experience which is still in process, often 
indeed not yet recognised as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even 
isolating’.[69] Ahmed complements Williams’s ‘structures of feeling’ by noting that we 
should also think of affect in terms of ‘feelings of structure’, markers of the way social, 
economic, and biopolitical ‘force and harm …[are] directed toward some bodies and not 
others’.[23] In a similar vein, Ann Cvetkovich defines trauma not as an individual wound, but 
a social one: trauma is ‘a name for experiences of socially situated … violence’.[63] Even 
experiences traditionally understood as wholly personal – such as physical pain – can be read 
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as ‘feelings that open bodies to others’.[64] As Marika Cifor says, ‘pain, like all emotion, is 
social’.[70]  
Much affect theory examines the complex ways in which the present moment is 
shaped by suffering. Traditional trauma theory offers a powerful framework for 
understanding the ongoing impacts of catastrophic events,[71-73] but several affect theorists 
find such models inadequate to capture the repeated and diffuse strain and injury mediated by 
structural inequity. Legacies of catastrophic events also reverberate in the present, each new 
tremor another intensity around which a particular mode of embodied suffering can accrete. 
Lauren Berlant speaks of ‘slow death’, the grinding down of vulnerable subjects that occurs 
not through dramatic events but through ‘structurally induced attrition … keyed to … 
membership in certain populations’.[73] To express such processes, many affect theorists 
seek a language for the way any experience of the present moment is always incomplete, in 
process; in Berlant’s terms, the present is ‘a thing that is sensed and under constant 
revision’.[73] Kathleen Stewart describes affect as symptom of the complex workings of 
biopolitical, economic and social pressures within the ‘weighted and reeling present’: 
From the perspective of ordinary affects, things like narrative and identity 
become tentative though forceful compositions of disparate and moving 
elements: the watching and waiting for an event to unfold, the details of 
scenes, the strange or predictable progression in which one thing leads to 
another, the still life that gives pause, the resonance that lingers.[74] 
Here, the present moment is read as a suspended and unpredictable site, suffused with lines of 
force social, political and personal. To put it another way, beyond identifying narrative 
‘incoherence’, affect discourse gives a way to recognise the strained, equivocal labour of 
incoherence, of inhabiting a cryptic present moment. The emergent present is veined with 
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lines of force somatic, emotional, and social, and may eventually find an as-yet-unknown 
meaning – but only retrospectively.[73]  
 Frank’s category of ‘chaos (anti)narrative’ is salient here, a narrative approximation 
of an anguished state in which the subject has lost any sense of agency and there is ‘absence 
of narrative order’, and no ‘discernable causality’.[26] Such experience is by definition 
unrepresentable until after the fact. Frank’s discussions of these representations focuses on 
their incoherence: ‘The lack of any coherent sequence is an initial reason why such stories are 
hard to hear; the teller is not understood as telling a “proper” story. But more significantly, 
the teller of the chaos story is not heard to be living a “proper” life, since in life as in story, 
one event is expected to lead to another’.[26] While this category is invaluable, I suggest that 
a problem with it is the way that, like any typology, it may inadvertently limit critical 
response to ascribing the label. While a coherent ‘self’ may indeed be absent, there is still 
much to say about the way a text conveys the flux and flow of a tortured temporality. Affect 
theory’s attention to the emergent present may give a way to read incoherent ‘chaos’ outside 
from a narrative framework, not only as a dark, formless stage in a personal story.  
 A focus on the present moment as an emergent site infused with heterogenous lines of 
force can shift the way one might think of illness and wider biopolitics. Anthropologist S. 
Lochlann Jain, for example, meets cancer prognosis by refusing a survivorship narrative 
telos, embracing an alternative ‘elegaic politics’ which moves beyond personal illness story 
to consider the environmental, socio-political and iatrogenic activities which contribute to the 
increase of breast cancer in the West.[75] Recent work seeks to combine a respect for the 
phenomenology of individual experience with a genealogical recognition of the subject as 
socially constructed.[35, 76] An episodic approach to illness representation and criticism 
meshes well with these dual goals, in that it may help resist subordinating discrete 
experiences or sociocultural context to a framing narrative of personal agency. Loosening 
 12 
 
traditional narrative telos can be part of a more ambiguous positioning of a ‘self’ as 
dependent on a range of other forces, both human and otherwise.[77-78] In a similar vein, 
Willis, Waddington and Marsden, scholars of literature, culture and medical history, have 
called for an ‘aesthetic epidemiology’ that approaches texts in search not of plot but ‘episodes 
– independent aesthetic moments given life in language’, rich in intertextual and historical 
connections.[7] In this article, I suggest that rather than approach moments in illness 
narration as either an individual failure to reach self-authorship, or as a temporary stage in an 
individual journey towards a coherent self and voice, we could approach these scenes as 
moments within social contexts, dramatizing (for example) the structural exclusions afflicting 
those enduring this condition, the institutional contexts that find their experience 
unintelligible, and the economic pressures that render many people in chronic pain 
profoundly precarious.  
Representations of chronic pain certainly can lament the experience of being trapped 
in a present torn from a coherent narrative of past and imagined future, as exemplified in the 
earlier quotations from Frank, Charon, and Nadelhaft. But I suggest that such texts may also 
locate their temporal horror differently, in ways that a narrative-focused criticism may 
conceal rather than help to understand. I am interested in the shifting lines of force (social, 
emotional, somatic) that shape the affective experience of these moments. To expand our 
vocabulary for this position, I offer a term for a particular affective experience of the present 
amid repeated marginalisation: the temporality of thwarted connection. This term seeks to 
convey the experience of a present in which one reaches for connection –for diagnosis, 
medical care, emotional support, or companionship amid acute suffering – while aware of the 
(justified) anticipation of imminent failure and future pain, the recollection of past failures 
and past pain, acute self-awareness of one’s present performativity in the clinical encounter, 
and one’s ongoing somatic and emotional distress. Diagnosis is often necessary for doctors to 
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offer further care, health insurance companies to fund it, and employers and loved ones to 
furnish support; as Alison Kafer describes, diagnosis may require ‘shuttling between 
specialists … repeated refusal of care and services, the constant denial of one’s experiences, 
the slow exacerbation of one’s symptoms, the years without recognition or diagnosis, the 
waiting’.[79, 44] As the ensuing literary case study dramatizes, attempts to have one’s pain 
experience validated stand a high risk of failure due to the vulnerability of chronic pain 
patients as liminal figures who breach diagnostic and social boundaries. Rather than assess 
this text in terms of its narrative coherence or drama, I want to explore how it depicts 
particular tormented moments before they solidify into stable ‘meaning’, conveying the 
complex temporality of an agonised present.  
 
LOUS HESHUSIUS, INSIDE CHRONIC PAIN 
 
Lous Heshusius, the author of this memoir, has suffered profoundly from chronic pain for 
many years. Her pain began after a near-fatal automobile accident in which she sustained 
significant neck trauma, and her suffering rapidly became so unbearable that she could barely 
function; at its worst, even moving or speaking became impossible. Originally an academic 
sociologist (until her pain prevented her working), she drew on her research skills to explore 
the biomedical models of pain and the social suffering which can attend pain within her 
American context. Her book Inside Chronic Pain: An Intimate and Critical Account is a 
blend of academic analysis and autobiography. 
Early in a first reading, Heshusius’s text may seem likely to exemplify narrative 
expectations enshrined within both medical humanities and popular survivorship discourse. 
She is explicit that she wants a restitution story and describes her efforts to seek one; further, 
she keeps a diary for years, and finds that ‘the ordering process demanded by language … 
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kept me from falling off the edge of life’.[80] It may seem appropriate, then, to approach 
Heshusius’s work through the ideas of self-authorship so influential in narrative medicine. 
Yet at the same time, she works hard to undercut those frameworks. She resists the 
framework of ‘quest’ narrative, not ‘honouring’ her pain ‘for the sense of purpose that can be 
discovered in it’, in Frank’s phrase, and warning that ‘the world also needs to witness the 
stories of pain that go on with no end in sight … Those that end in despair, in death. … The 
entire range of pain stories needs to be acknowledged to encourage political and social 
progress’.[80]. In this telling, an advantage of unhappy narrative is its potential activist 
power. But more than simply calling to diversify pain stories, Heshusius’s text undermines 
linear and teleogenic narration in multiple ways. Most significantly for this discussion, she 
powerfully conveys the affective strain of moments of suffering, demanding attention to 
particular episodes of agony without taming these within a story of personal transformation 
or enrichment.  
The complex temporal structures of Heshusius’s text dramatize how chronic pain is, 
etymologically, a pain of time, of tortured temporality as well as body. While few narrations 
are strictly chronological, since all feature flashback and prolepsis, in this case the structure 
itself is explicitly thematic, focused around key elements of her experience (pain medicine, 
healthcare practitioners, pharmacology, social relationship, and so on), and each features 
personal story interwoven with sociological academic study. Within each chapter the 
temporality of the discussion is highly fluid, interweaving early and late experience, and 
including dreams in their vivid temporal jumble. Heshusius describes a Kafka-esque search 
for diagnosis and effective treatment, ‘feeling as if I were on a treadmill, going from doctor to 
doctor, feeling no one spent enough time with me to understand my problems. Twice I went 
to the wrong hospital, as hospitals and clinics blurred in my mind. The buildings all looked 
alike. The doctors all seemed to do the same thing’; ‘their responses have been, more often 
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than not, contradictory. Maddening at times. I have walked out of their offices in utter 
confusion. What to believe now?’[80] Yet the connection Heshusius seeks is not merely the 
diagnostic event. She poignantly yearns for tenderness, for practitioners to be ‘kind’, and 
describes how appointment time constraints thwart the dialogue so necessary for healing and 
support; she experiences tight time constraints as violent, speaking of the ‘Medical Slaying of 
Minutes’.[80] She suffers profoundly from both physical pain and the attendant isolation and 
sense of delegitimation, and she repeatedly describes craving death. Heshusius’s work can 
certainly be approached as dramatizing the way that illness experience can destroy one’s 
sense of a coherent narrative self. But we can complement such an interpretation with an 
episodic reading, alert to the present as not yet an event but rather a suspended impasse, a 
waiting and reaching, within a very particular hostile social and medical milieu. I will briefly 
consider two scenes. 
 Heshusius describes repeated failed attempts to have her pain acknowledged. On one 
occasion she tries to explain the experience:  
I try to speak to doctors about the severity of my pain. My words float 
strangely in the air. As I pronounce them, I myself become a spectator. As 
soon as I begin to speak, I am no longer there. Someone else is speaking these 
words. Someone who has not suffered the pain, for it is much worse than she 
says. How can she say so little? … In the meantime, I am watching the doctor. 
Trying to see how he reacts. Did he get it? Should she be more dramatic? 
More detailed? But how? How can she, how can I, express this prelanguage 
torment?[80] 
Heshusius dramatizes the temporality of thwarted connection in her descriptions of repeated 
delegitimation. As Lara Birk notes, ‘patients must perform their pain. To be credible, the 
sufferer must act out her pain … Yet it is the inescapably performative nature of the behavior 
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that actually kills the very credibility one seeks to guarantee’.[81-82] Aware of past failure, 
dreading an imminent repeat, scrutinising her present ‘performance’ and the practitioner’s 
response, Heshusius brings her experience together under a sign of erasure, of annihilation. 
Her pronouns are unstable: initially she is I, until her words enter the communicative space to 
be heard by another. The profound vulnerability of that position is experienced as violent 
erasure – ‘I am no longer there’ – and she becomes detached from and even critical of the 
speaking woman (‘she’). Yet there is still an I -- a rightly apprehensive subject, watching the 
doctor and trying to gauge if the performance is adequate. Her closing lamentation is 
poignant. How to communicate this lived reality in the face of repeated disbelief, 
noncomprehension, and despair? Here stable meaning is elusive and recognition is lacking, 
but Heshusisus’s prose in this fragment conveys her labour amid the suspended moment of 
chaos, the burden to communicate and to endure this moment fraught with intersecting lines 
of force affective, social and cognitive.  
 A second fragment also conveys the affective complexity of the emergent present at a 
particular moment in her chronic pain experience: 
During my worst four years, every day resembled dying. Even now, I often 
feel strangely close to death. … because this life in pain has asked of me to 
part from nearly all that I thought constituted my life. Death as afscheid 
nemen. I have to say this in Dutch, my mother tongue, to capture what I mean. 
To say goodbye, to take leave in the deep sense of parting – parting for a very 
long time, perhaps for ever, from people, from places, from activities that are 
very dear. This parting as an ongoing process often renders an aloneness that 
feels total and so numbing that it brings on more despair and more pain. 
Isolation, and the taboo that slowly develops about talking about one’s pain to 
others, intensifies inner turmoil and intensifies the pain itself.[80] 
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Here, too, Heshusius exemplifies the temporality of thwarted connection – an agonised 
present informed by past failures to connect and apprehension of ongoing alienation. As 
before, she brings the complex temporality of the moment together under a sign of a self 
erased, excluded, gone. She describes inhabiting the present as an ongoing farewell – her 
daily life is ‘afscheid nemen’. This trope conveys profound temporal complexity: a leave-
taking acknowledges an imminent event of separation, a future without that person. Yet 
Heshusius uses this metaphor to describe not an imminent event but an ongoing state -- an 
agonised leave-taking, prolonged and unfinished, for a person whose pain is taboo.  
 Heshusius’s book offers a necessarily harrowing and relentless reading experience, 
but she offers moments of relief. What is unexpected is that several of these consolations are 
antithetical to the satisfactions of narrative medicine. First, she experiences a moment of 
mindful awareness that overflows with solace. As Mark Sullivan and David Zucker explain, 
mindfulness requires resisting turning experience into narrative. Heshusius finds this state 
profoundly beneficial, describing a ‘disappearing me’, ‘surrendering these things called “I” 
and “pain.”’[80] Furthermore, writing also yields benefits to Heshusius that are not best read 
as functions of a ‘coherent’ narrative self. It offers a relief to the degree that it helps her feel 
heard and witnessed in the moment. Heshusius finds that her diary ‘gave me both an intimate 
“other” to go to … My scribbles are there. They cannot run away, as have friends and 
colleagues, as well as many doctors. They are waiting for me’.[80]. Her text is a plea for 
witness of moments of suffering. Finally, Heshusius describes how attending to the 
fragmentary moments presented through her diaries can produce something different from the 
usual narrative arc of a personal journey: 
as my story takes shape there are many moments of despair, bewilderment, 
and grief, and many moments of feeling abandoned by doctors and friends 
alike. Often these moments appear as they did in my journals in all their 
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sharpness. I ask the reader to bear with me, as I slowly learn to place these 
moments in the larger contexts of cultural and human complexities and 
suffering of all kinds.[80] 
Here Heshusius positions her diary fragments not within a coherent story of self, but rather 
within a wider cultural context. Fittingly, she ends her book by discussing current activist 
efforts to raise awareness and transform funding for chronic pain research.  
If we read Heshusius’s text in search of an effort to restore a narrative sense of self, 
what we find is a failure, a refusal to ‘honour’ illness ‘for the sense of purpose that can be 
discovered in it’.[42] But if we read it episodically, open to the affective weight of the 
moments she describes, then the emphasis shifts to the tortured temporality of repeated 
efforts of connection, the profound need for a transformed social and medical response to 
those living with chronic pain, and the affective complexity of moments of illness experience 
before narrative can emerge.  
In considering reader position, my article overlaps to some extent with Claire 
McKechnie’s defence of narrative as central to any reader’s interpretative work.[5] 
McKechnie approaches narrative as describing any act of successful communication or 
‘transmission of an idea’, and she calls us to recognise the narrativity of multiple media. 
McKechnie also argues that any reader must inevitably respond to a text using a narrative 
framework. To illustrate her point, McKechnie offers a sensitive analysis of an excerpt from 
Dennis Potter’s reflections on the way his awareness of dying has transformed his perception 
of the natural world, in which he describes noticing with splendour of apple blossom. 
McKechnie argues that the work of reading and understanding these words by Potter 
inevitably requires a reader ‘ordering information’ into ‘story’: ‘It is only through narrative 
that we gain access to Potter’s world and get a sense of what he is experiencing’.[5]  
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 I share McKechnie’s eagerness to see an broader understanding of narrativity as 
applicable to a multitude of media; and if narrative is taken broadly to mean any act of 
meaning-making, then I agree that any reader makes a narrative -- although I suspect that 
defining all acts of meaning-making as narrative might diminish a useful specificity in the 
term. Either way, however, I want to notice and unsettle the assumption that the act of 
reading must incur an orientation towards teleogenesis, an assumption about how a textual 
passage is oriented towards a particular unfurling in imagined future time. The narrative 
McKechnie gleans from Potter’s words is highly teleogenic, reading his description of 
blossom as ‘captur[ing] the transitory and temporary nature of life and the inevitability of 
death and decay’. I agree this is a valid story that a reader could feel rise within themselves as 
they read Potter’s words. But what I argue in this present article is that such a teleogenic 
narrative framing by the reader is not the only viable response. Indeed, while McKechnie’s 
reading finds his description of the blossom to be about how life is ‘beautiful, but it is 
fleeting’, Potter’s words in the extract she cites do not describe the blossom as ephemeral, or 
include any bittersweet contemplation of the way they will fade. Rather, his focus is on the 
blossom as extraordinarily vivid, ‘the whitest, frothiest blossom that there ever could be, and 
I can see it’.[5] Without dismissing McKechnie’s thoughtful reading, I suggest it could be 
complemented by an episodic reading, dwelling with the scene as a moment in itself, not only 
implying future decline, not only about a temporal trajectory, but about something instant, 
present, embodied, and now. Potter himself invites exactly such a response, exclaiming, ‘The 
fact is, if you see the present tense, boy do you see it!’[5] In this fragment, Potter does not 
subordinate his enhanced awareness to his imminent death. To say it another way, to read 
episodically is to recognise that the meaning of a scene may not stem only from its sequel. 
 




Describing the need for new ethical modes of being on human-damaged earth, Donna 
Haraway calls for ‘staying with the trouble’, to develop a capacity to remain with the distress 
and tumult, choosing to focus on the present.[83] Haraway formulates this concept within her 
cultural studies work on ecological devastation, but I find her phrase invaluable in this 
different context. I suggest the phrase can also capture the challenge and promise of an 
episodic, moment-focused reading. In such a reading, one does not seek to move too quickly 
to discerning a narrative framework, wary of the way that framing can leach the painful 
affective complexity from a representation of an emerging present.  
It is difficult to hear suffering without imposing a narrative framework.[84-86] 
Indeed, narrative medicine has shown that narrative typologies can be invaluable in the way 
they help hearers/readers to better notice aspects of patient experience. While I greatly 
respect this approach, I suggest that it can fruitfully be complemented by an episodic focus, 
letting disturbing moments stand alone before taming them within a narrative of progress, 
personal meaning, or other telos and consolation. As a parallel to ‘flash writing’, here I am 
urging what might be called ‘flash reading’, a willingness to surrender – even if briefly - to 
the instant of the textual encounter, to the passage, the excerpt, the troubling episode, and to 
let that extract sit with you, remain with you, haunt you, without closing it off within a 
narrative arc. I do not suggest this is a novel approach - this kind of episodic reading has 
always been part of a reader’s repertoire of response. Rather, I am seeking to name it and to 
bring it more consciously into the strategies of our analytic discourses, specifically in the 
hope of disrupting certain axioms of illness narrative study, resisting inadvertent 
hierarchalisation of illness experience, and crucially, feeling towards an articulation of the 




Ann Jurecic, a scholar of literature and life writing,warns that literary criticism of pain 
has often failed to consider the question of ethical response. Following Scarry’s formulation 
of pain as annihilating the world, critics have tended to read representations of pain for the 
way they convey the experience as incommunicable, and failing to recognise how what these 
narrations often seek is not someone to understand the specific nature of the pain, but rather 
to acknowledge the reality of the suffering.[87] Sharing Jurecic’s concern, I suggest reading 
episodically can also lead to a different sense of the affective response of a reader/auditor: not 
to respond to suffering with ‘you are so brave’, or even ‘your pain is a mystery’, but with ‘I 
believe you suffer and I stand beside you’. This kind of reading/hearing stance may also have 
value in the context of encounters between healthcare practitioners and patients. Catherine 
Belling has suggested that lyric may be more helpful than narrative for describing the process 
of reflective practitioners, capturing the need to ‘pause the momentum of plot and to focus 
down, observe closely and question deeply’.[1] In a similar vein, I would suggest that 
alongside narrative competence, practitioners need to be aware of how listening for narrative 
also has risks. Rather than foregrounding the coherence of some illness representations, value 
may inhere in the rupture and the breach – we can heed these traces of embodied suffering 
before they solidify into story. 
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